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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PAY UP OR ZIP UP: GIVING UP THE RIGHT TO PROCREATE
AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION

It is “better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind . . . . Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.”1 These infamous words written by
Justice Holmes in 1927 allowing state ordered sterilization have been the
source of controversy and debate for the last seventy-six years. Throughout
this time, state courts and the United States Supreme Court have continuously
grappled with the idea of what kind of protection to afford an individual in
regard to his right to procreate. While mandatory sterilization is not as
prominent a remedy these days,2 the latest trend3 is to condition a criminal’s
probation on the promise that he or she will not procreate during the
probationary period.
This note will examine a person’s right to procreate in light of the recent
Wisconsin Supreme Court case of Wisconsin v. Oakley.4 After a historical
analysis of the right to privacy, this note will consider what constitutional
standard should be used to examine the right to procreate. The analysis will
then turn to a comparison of rights lost while in prison against those lost while
on probation and will ultimately conclude that rights infringed upon while on
probation are subject to a lesser standard of constitutional scrutiny than the
infringement of fundamental rights of a free person. This note will argue that
the decision in Wisconsin v. Oakley to make probation conditional on a
promise not to procreate is both constitutional and a valuable alternative to
prison.
INTRODUCTION
In Wisconsin v. Oakley, Defendant David Oakley, the father of nine
children by four different women intentionally refused to make child support

1. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
2. See generally Jason O. Runckel, Note, Abuse It and Lose It: A Look at California’s
Mandatory Chemical Castration Law, 28 PAC. L.J. 547 (1997) (discussing the growing use of
mandatory chemical castration for repeat sex offenders).
3. See generally Dee McAree, Deadbeat Dads Told to Stop Having Kids, NAT’L L. J. (Sept.
26, 2002), available at http://law.com.
4. Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001).
399
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payments and was behind in payments in excess of $25,000.5 The circuit court
rationalized that had Mr. Oakley paid something or made an earnest effort to
pay anything, he would not be in court that day. Recognizing that if Mr.
Oakley went to prison, he would not be in a position to support any of his
children, Judge Hazelwood sentenced him to three years in prison on the first
count, imposed and stayed an eight-year term on the two other counts, and
imposed a five-year term of probation consecutive to his incarceration. His
probation was conditioned on that fact that “while on probation, Oakley [could
not] have any more children unless he demonstrate[d] that he had the ability to
support them and that he [was] supporting the children he already had.”6 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that in light of the ongoing victimization
of Oakley’s nine children and his record of disregard for the law, the condition
of not procreating unless he can support that child and his current children is
not overly broad and is reasonably related to Oakley’s rehabilitation.7 Mr.
Oakley argued that the condition imposed by Judge Hazelwood violated his
constitutional right to procreate, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reasoned
that because Oakley was convicted of intentionally refusing to pay child
support, which was a felony in Wisconsin, and could have been imprisoned for
six years, the probation condition which infringes on his right to procreate was
valid.8
I. RIGHT TO PRIVACY
While the phrase “right to privacy” is not explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution,9 courts have found an implicit guarantee of the right to privacy in
different sections of the Constitution. In a line of decisions going back as far
as 1891,10 the Supreme Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution.11 In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have found
at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment,12 the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments,13 in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights,14 in the Ninth

5. Id. at 202 (all facts articulated in this section are taken from the court’s opinion in
Oakley).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 201.
8. Id. at 201-02.
9. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
10. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891).
11. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
12. See id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
13. See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 350 (1967)).
14. See id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)).
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Amendment,15 or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment.16
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no
“state [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.”17 While courts have not defined the term “liberty” with great
exactness, it certainly denotes more than just mere freedom from bodily
restraint.18 As early as 1923, the Supreme Court was declaring that one’s
liberty included:
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.19

The Supreme Court has recognized that within this zone of privacy lie
several fundamental constitutional guarantees,20 and in deciding which rights
are “fundamental” the courts must assess whether there is an explicit or
implicit guarantee of this right in the Constitution.21
A.

Fundamental Rights

The Supreme Court has found that several rights not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution should be protected as fundamental rights. One
example of this is the right to marry.22 In Griswold v. Connecticut, the
Supreme Court declared that, “Marriage is a coming together for better or
worse, hopefully enduring and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”23 The
Supreme Court sees the fundamental rights of personal, marital, familial, and
sexual privacy to be protected under the Constitution,24 and it is a well-settled
principle with the Court that the Constitution places limits on a State’s right to
interfere with a person’s most basic decisions about family and parenthood.25

15. See id. (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldbert, J., concurring)).
16. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 486. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
19. Id.
20. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
21. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
22. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
23. Id.
24. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973) (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486).
25. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978) (“The right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals” and “is part of the fundamental ‘right of privacy’
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
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The Right to Procreate as a Fundamental Right

The Supreme Court has never explicitly guaranteed anyone a liberty
interest in having a sex drive or in not being temporarily prevented from
producing offspring.26 However, the Supreme Court recognized a broad right
to procreate in Skinner v. Oklahoma.27 Petitioner, Jack Skinner, was convicted
of the crimes of stealing chickens and robbery with firearms, and he was
sentenced to the Oklahoma State Reformatory. Under Oklahoma’s Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act, any habitual criminal convicted of felonies
involving moral turpitude may have a proceeding brought against them in court
for a judgment that such a person should be rendered sexually sterile. The
Supreme Court decided that because sterilization would permanently deprive
Skinner of his right to procreate, the Oklahoma statute was unconstitutional.28
Even though the Court decided Skinner purely on equal protection
grounds, Justice Douglas inferred that procreation is a fundamental right by
saying, “[W]e are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may
have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects.”29 Justice Douglas went on
to state that a “strict scrutiny” analysis must be employed whenever a state’s
classification authorizes sterilization because such a classification affects a
fundamental right.30
The right to have children is a basic human right and an aspect of the
fundamental liberty that the Constitution zealously guards for all Americans.31
The Supreme Court has stated that:
[The] law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education, . . . [and the law protects] the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.32

Although all of the Supreme Court cases dealing with the fundamental
right of procreation have been in the context of a permanent deprivation of the

26. See Runckel, supra note 2, at 566.
27. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (all facts articulated in this section are taken
from the Court’s opinion in Skinner).
28. Id. at 541.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 536.
32. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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right to procreate,33 in broad terms it is well accepted that the right to procreate
has been declared a fundamental right in our society. Under the Establishment
Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to
privacy in our country has been extended to include the right of a person not to
be permanently deprived of the right to procreate.
It can be argued that Mr. Oakley’s right to procreate is not a classical
example of a fundamental right because he is not being permanently deprived
of this right like other petitioners were in previous procreation cases.34 The
previous cases that deem the right to procreate as a fundamental right that
should be strictly scrutinized35 are not necessarily controlling for Mr. Oakley’s
case. Those cases deal with issues such as sterilization and irreversibly taking
away someone’s right to have a child. Here, in contrast, Mr. Oakley’s right to
procreate is only being infringed upon for a limited time and by his own
choice. If he can prove that he is able to support his current children and any
future children, he has total freedom to procreate. This case is not analogous
to earlier sterilization cases because there is no permanent deprivation of Mr.
Oakley’s right to procreate. Whether by supporting his family, waiting out the
probation sentence, or waiving probation in order to go to prison, Mr. Oakley
will in a short matter of time be returned the right to procreate as often as he
chooses. His right to procreate is merely restricted, not eliminated.36
However, it is not necessary to examine this argument at great length
because the constitutionality of Mr. Oakley’s probation condition does not rest
on whether or not the right to procreate is a fundamentally protected right by
the Constitution. Even conceding that the right to procreate is given broad
constitutional protection as a fundamental right, the condition placed on Mr.
Oakley’s probation can still pass constitutional scrutiny.

33. See generally Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535 (declaring a state sterilization statute
unconstitutional, stating that “marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, farreaching and
devastating effects . . . . He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.” (emphasis added)); Casey, 505
U.S. at 833 (1992) (right to terminate pregnancy affirmed); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(right to terminate pregnancy); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (ban on
contraception).
34. See the situations described in note 33, supra.
35. See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
36. See Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 208, 212 (Wis. 2001); see also Goodwin v.
Turner, 702 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (an inmate denied the right to artificially
inseminate his wife, tried to rely on Skinner v. Oklahoma for support that the right to procreate is
a fundamental right, but the court stated that “because Skinner involved a permanent deprivation
of the means to procreate, rather than a mere delay as in petitioner’s case, this Court finds Skinner
non-dispositive”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

404

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:399

II. STANDARDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
A.

Strict Scrutiny

Depending on what type of infringement is occurring, there are different
standards employed for constitutional scrutiny, the highest level of which is
strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny applies to any government action that calls for
differential treatment of individuals because of their race, national origin,
alienage, or any characteristic the Court deems “suspect.”37 When one’s
“fundamental rights” are involved, the Court has held that this too deserves a
strict scrutiny analysis and that any regulation limiting these rights may be
justified only when there is a compelling state interest, and the legislative
enactment must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests
at stake.38
In practice, for a means to be “narrowly tailored,” there must be no feasible
alternative available, and it must be the “least-intrusive means” possible.39
This is the crucial difference from the rational basis test, and it makes the
“narrowly tailored” prong of the test the most difficult to meet.40 In every
situation, a feasible alternative can almost always be devised, and the history
of cases decided under strict scrutiny show that “almost all government actions
analyzed under strict scrutiny are found unconstitutional.”41 In fact, many
have described the strict scrutiny test as “strict in theory, fatal in fact.”42

37. Robert S. Logan, Note, The Reverse Equal Protection Analysis: A New Methodology For
“Special Needs” Cases, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447, 464 (2000).
38. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1617 (1973); and Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).
39. Logan, supra note 37, at 464 (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 51).
40. See id.
41. See id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989)
(“[J]udges engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct can almost always imagine
some alternative means by which the objectives of the [government] might have been
accomplished.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 2 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU & WILLIAM J.
RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 25.02 at 8 (2d ed. 1997) (“[S]trict scrutiny as employed
by the Court create[s] virtually insurmountable hurdles for the government seeking to defend its
classification.”)). Examples of cases where state statutes have been struck down under a strict
scrutiny analysis include Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (statute requiring deadbeat
parents to get court approval before obtaining a marriage license); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (abortion statute prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute prohibiting any person from using any drug, medicinal
article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (statute allowing sterilization for habitual felony offenders).
42. See Logan, supra note 37, at 464-65
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Intermediate Scrutiny

The intermediate level of scrutiny was developed as a separate standard
because there are instances in which neither the rigorous level of strict scrutiny
nor the deferential standard of rational basis is appropriate.43 Craig v. Boren,44
the first case to use strict scrutiny, identified gender as the first of the so-called
“quasi-suspect” classifications that trigger intermediate scrutiny because
gender meets some of the qualities of suspect classes but not all.45
Intermediate scrutiny examines whether the legislative enactment serves an
“important” governmental interest and whether the means used are
“substantially related” to accomplishing that goal.46
C. Rational Basis
If an act is to be reviewed under the rational basis standard, it is presumed
that the action is a legitimate exercise of governmental discretion.47
Historically, courts have used the rational basis level of scrutiny when
evaluating social or economic legislation.48 It is the default method for
examining assertions of equal protection violations, and it applies unless the
governmental action uses classifications such as race or sex which have often
been used as a means of discrimination.49
When a right involved is not fundamental, the state’s regulation will pass
constitutional review if it meets the mere rationality test.50 To satisfy this mere
rationality test, a court only needs to examine whether the act in question
serves a legitimate governmental interest and whether the classification used is
rationally related to furthering that governmental interest.51 While rights
involved still receive constitutional protection under the rational basis test, it is
an extremely deferential standard and an easy test for legislation to pass.52

43. See id. at 465 (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-33
at 1609-10 (1988)).
44. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
45. See Logan, supra note 37, at 465.
46. See id. at 465 (citing Craig, 429 U.S. at 197).
47. See id. at 462 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985)).
48. See id. at 462-63 (citing Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien
Corporations: Towards Intermediate Scrutiny for a Quasi-Suspect Classification, 59 MO. L. REV.
569, 578 (1994)).
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949).
51. See Logan, supra note 37, at 462-63 (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440).
52. See id.
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There have been variations of the rational basis standard used that are
somewhat more demanding on the government.53 One variation requires a
“fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”54 Other courts
have struck down statutes under rational basis scrutiny after undertaking a
detailed examination of the government’s purposes and means.55 This
approach has been described as “rational basis with teeth.”56 Although these
versions of the rational basis test have sometimes provided a level of scrutiny
higher than just mere rationality, these variations on the traditional rational
basis test generally still provide a high degree of deference to legislatures.57
D. Analysis
The Fourteenth Amendment’s privacy protection forbids the government
from infringing on fundamental liberty interests of a free person unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.58 Under
an interpretation that the right to procreate is a fundamental right, Mr. Oakley
argued that his probation condition warrants strict scrutiny.59 If the restriction
on Mr. Oakley’s right to procreate in Wisconsin v. Oakley were to be analyzed
under the strict scrutiny approach, the probation condition must be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.60
Both the majority and dissent agree that there is a compelling state interest
at stake.61 As the majority in the case points out, refusal to pay child support
by so-called “deadbeat parents” has fostered a crisis with devastating
implications for children today.62 In 1997, out of 26.4 billion dollars awarded
by a court order to custodial mothers, only 15.8 billion dollars was actually
paid, and these figures only represent a small portion of the child support

53. See id.
54. See id. (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
55. See id. (citing City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (using rational basis scrutiny to strike
down the denial of a zoning permit for a group home for the retarded because the court found the
denial was based purely on prejudice); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) (invalidating a
state statute prohibiting use of state funds for education of illegal aliens under a standard
requiring that the legislation must further a “substantial goal” to demonstrate the rationality of
denying such a benefit)).
56. See Logan, supra note 37, at 462-63 (citing Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah
Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 260 (1996).
57. See id. at 464 (citing Kenji Yoshino, Note, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The
Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 488 n.5
(1998)).
58. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
59. See Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 207 (Wis. 2001).
60. Id. at 208.
61. See generally id.
62. Id. at 203.
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obligations that could be collected if every custodial parent had a support
order.63 Single mothers who do not receive payment of child support often fall
below the poverty line.64 In addition to long-term consequences of nonpayment of child support such as poor health, behavioral problems,
delinquency and low educational attainment, inadequate child support is a
direct contributor to child poverty.65 In our country, approximately twelve
million children, or about one in every six, live in poverty.66 In the state of
Wisconsin alone, poverty strikes approximately 200,000 children.67 There is
little doubt that payment of child support benefits poverty-stricken children,68
so enforcing child support orders is a compelling state interest.
The majority in the case also argued that there is a compelling state interest
in rehabilitating Oakley through probation rather than prison because the
alternative to probation is incarceration for eight years, which would further
victimize his children.69
Although Mr. Oakley concedes that the State’s interest in requiring parents
to support their children is compelling, he argues that the means employed are
not narrowly tailored.70 Mr. Oakley believes that his right to procreate is
effectively eliminated by this condition because he “probably never will have
the ability to support his children.”71
The majority of the court argued that this restriction is narrowly tailored
because Mr. Oakley can satisfy this condition by not intentionally refusing to
support his current nine children and any future children as required by the
law.72 The court argued that the condition is narrowly tailored because the
alternative – eight years in prison – is much broader than this conditional
impingement on his procreative freedom because it would deprive Mr. Oakley
of his fundamental right to be free from physical restraint.73 Judge Hazelwood
of the circuit court actually believed that he was preserving much of Oakley’s

63. Id. (citing United States Census Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Current Population
Survey, Child Support for Custodial Mothers and Fathers, 1997 (1998), available at
www.census.gov).
64. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d. at 204 (citing Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child
Support Policy in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER (J. Thomas Oldham & Marygold S.
Melli eds., 2000)).
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Bernadetter D. Proctor & Joseph Falaker, United States Census Bureau,
Poverty in the United States vi (2000)).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 204.
69. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 212.
70. Id. at 208.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 212.
73. Id.
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liberty through this condition on his probation because he did not send him to
prison.74
While the majority in the case seemed to believe that this condition on Mr.
Oakley’s probation would pass even the strict scrutiny test, the dissent states,
equally as strong, that this test could never pass that heightened level of
scrutiny. The dissent looked to the case of Zablocki v. Redhail75 for help in
deciding what it means to be “narrowly tailored.” That case held that a
Wisconsin statute that prohibited people from marrying until they established
that their child support obligations were met was not a justifiable means of
advancing the state’s interest in providing support for children.76 The Court
held that the Wisconsin law provided other available means of advancing the
state’s interest that did not infringe upon the liberty interest at stake.77 The
dissent argued that the Zablocki analysis of “narrowly tailored” applies to this
case, and because there are several less intrusive means of advancing the
compelling state interest in ways that do not infringe upon Mr. Oakley’s right
to procreate, this condition can never pass the heightened strict scrutiny
analysis.78 Examples of less intrusive remedies would be for Oakley to have
his probation conditioned on spending a substantial amount of time in jail with
work release privileges, maintaining two full time jobs, or taking parenting
classes.79
The majority of the court in Wisconsin v. Oakley erred by arguing the case
under a strict scrutiny analysis because it is a losing argument. Strict scrutiny
is the highest standard of scrutiny, and under this standard, the means
employed by the government must be narrowly tailored to advance the
compelling government interest.80 This requires the least-intrusive means and
no feasible alternative.81 While the first prong of the test, compelling state
interest, is clearly met, Mr. Oakley’s probation condition is not narrowly
tailored. The dissent points out several realistic alternatives to limiting his
right to procreate, so it clearly cannot be claimed that there is no feasible
alternative.
The majority argued a broader definition of narrowly tailored by claiming
that Mr. Oakley can easily bypass the restriction on his probation by paying the
support to his children and that probation is a better alternative to prison.
While these arguments are compelling, the “narrowly tailored” prong is a high
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 213-14.
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
Id. at 388-90.
Id. at 389.
See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 218.
Id. at 218 n.3.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973).
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level of scrutiny that has been shown to strike down most government actions
encroaching on fundamental rights.82 The majority in Oakley has misplaced
their argument because under a strict scrutiny analysis, the restriction on Mr.
Oakley’s probation that he not have any more children unless he demonstrates
the ability to support them and that he is supporting the children he already
has, would be unconstitutional because it is limiting a fundamental right to
procreate by means that are not narrowly tailored.
Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin should lose on its strict scrutiny
argument, the restriction placed on Mr. Oakley’s probation is not actually
unconstitutional because strict scrutiny is the wrong standard to apply. Even
conceding that the right to procreate is a fundamental right into which an
encroachment would normally demand strict scrutiny because Mr. Oakley is on
probation, an infringement on his fundamental rights invoke a lesser standard
of scrutiny.
III. STANDARD OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY FOR PRISON AND PROBATION
A.

Introduction

For various reasons, including demographics and the changing size of the
prison population, conventional intermediate sanctions such as probation,
parole, and suspended sentences have come to be regarded as valuable
alternatives to incarceration.83 What has become increasingly popular is the
imposition of conditions on conventional probationary sentences.84 Typically,
the court will grant probation subject to a list of specific conditions.85 Classic
examples of these conditions on probation include substance abuse
rehabilitation, employment, educational or training programs, confinement,
monitoring, and others.86 The work-release program, a commonly imposed
82. Examples of cases where state statutes have been struck down under a strict scrutiny
analysis include Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (statute requiring deadbeat parents to
get court approval before obtaining a marriage license); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(abortion statute prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (statute prohibiting any person from using any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (statute allowing sterilization for habitual felony offenders).
83. See Developments in the Law – Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863,
1944-45 (1998).
84. Id. at 1947.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1947-48 (citing Thomas Bonczar, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Characteristics of
Adults on Probation, 1995, at 7 (1997) (59% of federal probationers were required to participate
in rehabilitation programs in 1995, 40% of federal probationers were required to participate in
employment, educational or training programs, and confinement, monitoring or other restrictions
were required of 31% of federal probationers in 1995)).
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condition to probation, has been available since at least 1975 in every state and
in the federal system,87 and by 1990, home surveillance systems were available
in all fifty states.88
Although the concept of probation in a criminal case has its origins in the
common law, the alternative remedy of probation is now governed by statute.89
Massachusetts enacted the first probation statute in 1878,90 basing it largely
upon the groundwork laid by John Augustus.91 A number of states quickly
followed, and the federal probation legislation was passed in 1925.92
Currently, all fifty states and the federal government have probation statutes,
and the number of individuals currently on probation is growing rapidly each
year.93
Legislatures give little direction to sentencing courts on how to handle
probation conditions.94 When describing the scope of a court’s sentencing
power, courts and commentators have used terms such as “breathtaking” and
have taken notice of the fact that legislative limitations are “conspicuously

87. See id. at 1948 (citing ROBERT ROSENBLUM & DEBRA WHITCOMB, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY WORK RELEASE/PRE-RELEASE PROGRAM 11 (1978)).
88. See Developments in the Law, supra note 83, at 1948 (citing INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS
IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 85-120, 104 (Michael Tonry & Kate Hamilton eds., 1995)).
89. See Andrew Horwitz, Note, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial Moralizing: Some
Proposals For Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 75,
79-80 (2000) (citing Bruce D. Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When
Reasonableness Is Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 45, 47-50 (1981) (discussing the
evolution of probation)).
90. Id. at 80.
91. See id. (referring to John Augustus, a Boston cobbler, as the inventor of probation)
(citing ANDREW KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND
PROBATION 68 (2d ed. 1997)).
92. Id. (citing Greenberg, supra note 89, at 50-52).
93. See id.
In 1984 . . . there were 1.7 million people—one out of every thirty-five adult American
males—on probationary supervision. By 1996, that number had skyrocketed to well over
three million probationers. The numbers are equally staggering when one looks at the
percentage of convicted criminals who are placed on probation: forty-nine percent of the
defendants convicted of a felony in a state court in 1994 were placed on some form of
probation.
Id.
94. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 80.
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absent.”95 One media account “suggested that the content of special conditions
is limited only by the sentencing judge’s imagination.”96
B.

Reliance on Contract, Waiver, and Act of Grace Theories

When a defendant actually challenges a probation condition, there are
several procedural obstacles that must be overcome.97 The common feeling
among courts is that an offender is free to reject the imposition of probation
and to accept the alternative of incarceration.98 It is therefore believed that
once a defendant makes the “choice” of probation, he or she is precluded from
challenging the validity of these probationary conditions.99
The most common formulation of this preclusion theory is the “contract
theory,” the foundation of which is the belief that once a probationer accepts
probation as an alternative to incarceration, he has formed a contractual
agreement with the sentencing court.100 Both the Supreme Court101 and
Congress102 have invalidated the contract theory. Nevertheless, courts have
continued to use the contract theory in different forms.103
Another theory employed by courts to justify the imposition of conditions
on probation is the waiver theory.104 Under this theory, courts will find that by
accepting any conditions placed on his probation, a defendant has forfeited or
waived the right to challenge them later.105
A final theory used to justify probation conditions is the so-called “act of
grace” theory.106 The act of grace theory has its origins in two United States

95. Id. at 80, 81 (citing Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992);
Louis K Polonsky, Note, Limitations upon Trial Court Discretion in Imposing Conditions of
Probation, 8 GA. L. REV. 466, 468 (1974); see also Note, Judicial Review of Probation
Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 181 (1967) (stating that legislatures are reluctant to devise
pervasive standards of control)).
96. Id. at 81 (citing Kelly McMurry, For Shame: Paying for Crime Without Serving Time,
But with a Dose of Humility, TRIAL, May 1997, at 12).
97. See id. at 84.
98. Id.
99. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 84.
100. See id. (citing Greenberg, supra note 89, at 57).
101. Id. (citing Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (finding that “probation is a
matter of favor, not of contract”); see also Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 274 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (maintaining that probation should not be treated as a “kind of
bargain”)).
102. See id. at 84, 85 (discussing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which declared that
probation is a sentence in and of itself).
103. See id. at 85.
104. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 85.
105. Id. at 85-86.
106. Id. at 88.
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Supreme Court cases:107 Burns v. United States108 and Escoe v. Zerbst.109
Although the statements about grace were not part of the central holding of
these cases,110 courts soon began to rely on these statements about graciously
giving the convicted probation instead of incarceration. One commentator has
described the logic of the act of grace theory as such that:
[T]he convicted defendant has no right to expect anything less than the full
penalty prescribed by law. Thus, the sentencing judge has untrammeled
discretion to grant or withhold probation, and should he decide to offer the
offender a modicum of freedom, he may make the grant subject to any
conditions he believes to be proper. The probationer will not be heard to
complain of this voluntary act of clemency, even though the conditions
imposed are arbitrary, unfair, vague, or otherwise invalid.111

Like the contract theory, the Supreme Court called for an end to any
reliance on the act of grace theory, declaring it to be “clear . . . that a
probationer [could] no longer be denied due process in reliance on the dictum
in Escoe v. Zerbst that probation is an ‘act of grace.’”112 Despite the Supreme
Court’s clear rejection of any “act of grace” theory, some appellate courts
continue to rely on the theory as a justification for denying review of probation
conditions.113 The act of grace theory frequently appears today couched in
language such as “probation is not a right but a privilege.”114
While the contract theory, waiver theory, and act of grace theory may seem
like appealing arguments to justify why Mr. Oakley should forfeit his right to
procreate during his probationary period, the Supreme Court and Congress
have specifically rejected these theories. Therefore, it is unnecessary to even

107. Id.
108. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223 (1932).
109. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935).
110. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 89.
111. Id. (citing Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 189
(1967)).
112. Id. (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4 (1973) (punctuation in original)).
113. Id. (citing United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (relying on act
of grace theory to uphold several probation conditions, including one that precluded association
with “known homosexuals”); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 363 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(noting that “some reviewing courts continue to give lip service to the act of grace theory even
though the United States Supreme Court has repudiated it”); State v. Kohlman, 854 P.2d 318, 319
(Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (relying on act of grace theory to uphold unspecified probation conditions);
State v. Means, 257 N.W.2d 595, 600 (S.D. 1977) (relying on act of grace theory and applying
probation review standards to uphold several bail conditions that prohibited defendant from
participating in activities of American Indian Movement)).
114. See id. at 90 (citing Gilliam v. Los Angeles Mun. Ct., 159 Cal. Rptr 74, 77 (Cal Ct. App.
1979) (commenting that probation is a privilege, not a right); State v. Heyn, 456 N.W. 2d 157,
160 (Wis. 1990) (probation is privilege, not a right)).
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undergo an analysis of these theories. The only justification for Mr. Oakley’s
probation condition passing constitutional muster is under the theory that
probation, like prison, is subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny.
C. Prison Restrictions Are Not Analyzed under Strict Scrutiny
The greatest challenge to probation regulations is that these innovative
sentences imposed by sentencing courts infringe on one’s fundamental
rights.115 To properly understand what analysis probation conditions should
receive, it is important to first look at what constitutional standard of scrutiny
is used when fundamental rights of prisoners are infringed upon.
The leading case on the standard of scrutiny in the prison context is Turner
v. Safley.116 Two regulations were at issue in that case: a regulation on the type
of correspondence inmates were allowed to have with other inmates, and a
marriage regulation permitting an inmate to marry only with the permission of
the prison superintendent and only when there is a compelling reason to
provide this approval.117 The Supreme Court started its analysis of this case
with the proposition that: “[P]rison walls do not form a barrier separating
prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution.”118 However, the
Court then went into a lengthy analysis of several cases involving prisoners’
rights119 and ultimately concluded that “in none of these . . . ‘prisoners’ rights’
cases did the Court apply a standard of heightened scrutiny.”120 The Court
resolved the question of what constitutional standard to apply to prison
regulations when it stated that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests. In our view, such a standard is necessary if
‘prison administrators . . . , and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult
judgments concerning institutional operations.’”121
The Turner Court listed several factors that are relevant in determining the
reasonableness of a prison regulation. First, there must be a “valid, rational
connection” between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it.122 The governmental objective must also be
legitimate and neutral.123 A second factor is whether there are alternative

115. See Developments in the Law, supra note 83, at 1949.
116. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
117. Id. at 81-82.
118. Id. at 84-87.
119. Id. (analyzing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974)).
120. Id. at 87.
121. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
122. Id. at 90.
123. Id.
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means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.124 A third
condition is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will
have on guards, other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally.125 The final factor relevant in determining the reasonableness of a
prison regulation is that the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of the regulation.126
An example of how this lesser standard of scrutiny in the prison context
works is best shown through a comparison of two cases on the fundamental
right of marriage and procreation. At issue in the 1978 case of Zablocki v.
Redhail127 was a statute stating that any person with an obligation to pay child
support to a child not in their custody must obtain court permission to marry.128
Mr. Redhail was not on probation, parole, or incarcerated when he challenged
the constitutionality of this statue. The Court in Zablocki held that the statute
was unconstitutional because Mr. Redhail’s fundamental right to marry was
infringed, and the statute could not pass a heightened standard of strict
scrutiny.129
In contrast to this case is the 1994 case of Hernandez v. Coughlin.130
Hernandez, an inmate, brought an action against state correction officials for
denying him conjugal visitation rights. While acknowledging that many
constitutional guarantees survive incarceration,131 the Second Circuit relied on
Supreme Court precedent to hold that a prisoner’s fundamental right to marry
is substantially limited as a result of incarceration.132 The court found it
significant to note that Hernandez possessed the right to maintain his
procreative abilities for later use once released from custody.133
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the 1987 case of O’Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz,134 made this distinction between the rights of a free person and the
rights of one incarcerated even more clear. He stated that “lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system.”135 Chief Justice Rehnquist announced that prison regulations that
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
127. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
128. Id. at 375.
129. Id. at 388.
130. Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1994).
131. Id. at 136 (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)).
132. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)).
133. Id.
134. Turner, 482 U.S. at 78.
135. Id. at 348.
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allegedly infringed on constitutional rights were to be judged under a
“reasonableness” test which was less restrictive than the test of strict scrutiny
ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional
rights.136 In describing the “reasonableness test,” the Court relied upon the
four factors set out by the Turner v. Safely court to determine the
reasonableness of a prison regulation.137
Later cases have built upon this fundamental idea that the reasonableness
standard is to be applied to cases where a prisoner’s fundamental rights are
being restricted, even if the State under other circumstances would be required
to satisfy a more rigorous standard of review.138 It is now a well-settled
principle that a prisoner’s fundamental rights are subject to a lower standard of
constitutional scrutiny under the “reasonableness test.” Cases of this nature
include139 infringements upon the fundamental right of First Amendment
freedom of speech,140 First Amendment freedom of association,141 First
136. Id. at 347.
137. Id. at 350-53. The four factors from Turner were: (1) valid, rational connection between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it, (2)
alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates, (3) impact
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources generally, and (4) reasonableness of a prison regulation is that
the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation. Id.
138. See Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he proper standard for
determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to infringe on an inmate’s constitutional
rights is to ask whether the regulation is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interest.’”).
139. Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d, 200, 212 n.27 (Wis. 2001) (all examples of the cases
cited hereinafter in footnotes 140-47 of this note come from this opinion).
140. State v. Miller, 499 N.W.2d 215, 217-18 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that probation
condition prohibiting probationer from telephoning any woman not a member of his family
without prior permission was a reasonable and not overly broad infringement); United States v.
Turner, 44 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir. 1995) (asserting that probation condition requiring defendant
convicted of obstructing a federal court order to refrain from harassing, intimidating, or picketing
in front of any abortion family planning service center a permissible restriction because it was
reasonably related to the goal of prohibiting further illegal conduct); United States v. Terrigno,
838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding probation condition that defendant not speak for
money about her crime, even though it infringed on her right to free speech, because it was
reasonably related to her rehabilitation); United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 467 (3rd Cir.
1987) (upholding probation condition that defendant refrain from representing union as elected
official or paid employee because significant imposition upon defendant’s First Amendment
rights was “reasonable in light of the offense”).
141. Turner, 44 F.3d at 903 (ruling that probation condition prohibiting defendant from
harassing, intimidating or picketing in front of any abortion family planning services center
permissible restriction of First Amendment freedom of association when convicted of obstructing
federal court order and restriction reasonably related to goal of prohibiting further illegal
conduct); United States v. Hughes, 964 F.2d 536, 542-43 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding as
reasonable a probation condition that prohibited the defendant from representing or serving as
officer in Communications Workers of America constitutionally permissible when defendant
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Amendment freedom of religion,142 Second Amendment right to bear arms,143
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures,144
the right to engage in political activity or run for political office,145 freedom of
movement,146 and the right to procreate.147

convicted of violations of IRS Code and federal false statements statutes); United States v.
Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding probation condition that prevented
defendant from participating in any motorcycle club activities as reasonably related to the
defendant’s rehabilitation where he was convicted of being a felon in possession of a weapon);
Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing probation condition that
prohibited defendant from associating with Irish cultural, political, or social organizations as
reasonably related to the goals of probation—thereby constitutionally permissible—when
defendant, Irish Republican Army sympathizer, convicted of gun running).
142. United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 38 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that probation
condition prohibiting Native American juveniles who pleaded guilty to simple assault from
possessing firearms until age twenty-one is constitutionally permissible even though hunting with
firearm is an important religious ritual to juveniles because probation condition reasonably served
statutory goals of punishment, deterrence and public protection).
143. See generally Rice v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (ruling that
Congress could restrict a person’s right to possess a firearm, after a conviction for possession of
firearms by a convicted felon, even when a pardon was granted with regard to the underlying
felony).
144. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874-75 (1987) (upholding Wisconsin law allowing a
search of a probationer’s home as long as the probation officer has “reasonable grounds” to
believe the presence of contraband and reiterating its Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
language that “probationers . . . do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
restrictions.’”).
145. U.S. v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1181 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that probation condition on
elected official convicted of attempting to extort bribe lawfully prevented that official from
seeking or serving in elected public office during period of probation were valid because it would
assist in the probationer’s rehabilitation and protect the public); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d
144, 148 (5th Cir. 1979) (ruling that probationer convicted of violating federal election laws
could be lawfully prohibited from running for political office or engaging in political activities
during period of probation because the condition was reasonably related to the probationer’s
rehabilitation).
146. United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding probation condition
that prohibited defendants convicted of entering a submarine base illegally from coming within
250 feet of the base was reasonable “[g]iven the alternatives of imprisonment or some other
greater restriction” upon the defendant’s rights of movement, association, and speech); State v.
Cooper, 282 S.E.2d 436, 438-39 (N.C. 1981) (ruling that probation condition prohibiting
defendant from operating a motor vehicle on the public streets and highways between 12:01 a.m.
and 5:30 a.m. was reasonably related to defendant’s rehabilitation where defendant pled guilty to
fourteen crimes involving the use of stolen credit cards).
147. State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (rejecting strict scrutiny of
probation condition that required defendant to complete drug counseling and anger management
treatment before fathering any future children); Krebs v. Schwarz 568 N.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1997) (upholding probation condition that required defendant convicted of sexually
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D. The Similarities of Prison and Probation
While there have been no major court rulings on what constitutional
standard of scrutiny to apply to probationers,148 court rulings have made it
clear that probation and prison are similar enough to warrant the same lower
standard of scrutiny for restrictions on a probationer’s fundamental rights. The
Supreme Court has held that “Probation, like incarceration, is a form of
criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or
plea of guilt . . . . Probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set
of points) on a continuum of possible punishments.”149 The Supreme Court
has made clear that probationers do not enjoy the same absolute freedom to
which every citizen is entitled, but instead, a “conditional liberty” that is
dependent on observance of their special probation restrictions150 that in
themselves infringe on constitutional rights.151
There is a great public interest in the protection of the community that
justifies treating incarceration and probation similarly.152 Although it may be
argued that probationers were not sentenced to prison and therefore deserve a
stronger degree of government protection, this reasoning is flawed.153 “By
definition, a prisoner is not a risk to the community.”154 In contrast, a
probationer’s freedom represents a continuing risk to the community because
he is more inclined to commit a crime than a law-abiding citizen.155 Therefore,
closely supervising a probationer is the only way a state can reduce the risk to
the community that the probationer will violate the law again, and this
accordingly justifies a high level of intrusion into probationer’s rights.156
“Furthermore, although probationers certainly have a greater expectation of
privacy than prisoners, any reasonable expectation of privacy must be less than
that of law-abiding persons.”157
assaulting his daughter to obtain permission from his probation agent prior to engaging in sexual
relationship was reasonable and not overly broad).
148. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 n.2 (“We have recently held that prison regulations allegedly
infringing constitutional rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests. We have no occasion in this case to decide where, as a general
matter, that test applies to probation regulations as well.”).
149. See id. at 874.
150. See Logan, supra note 37, at 481 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Logan, supra note 37, at 481 (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880 (“[I]t is the very
assumption of the institution of probation that the probationer is in need of rehabilitation and is
more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law . . . .”)).
156. See id.
157. See id.
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Analysis

When a person is convicted of a crime and sent to prison, he loses certain
rights that people not violating the law may enjoy. Since the Court has held
that prisoners deserve a lower standard of constitutional scrutiny158 and that
probation and prison contain some of the same fundamental characteristics, it
is a logical extension of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
“reasonableness test”159 in the prison context to apply it to the probation
context.
The “reasonableness test” was formulated for the prison context, and it is
necessary to adapt its prongs to fit the different context of probation. Under
the first prong of the test, one looks to see if there is a “valid, rational
connection”160 between the probation regulation and the legitimate government
interest justifying it. Mr. Oakley conceded that there exists a compelling
government interest in a father paying child support and not having any more
children below the poverty line. Because Mr. Oakley has shown an intentional
disregard for his children and the law mandating him to support his children, it
is not hard to see a connection between a restriction forbidding him from
procreating until he shows he can support all of his current children, which is
the government’s legitimate interest.
The second factor in the Turner test asks if there are “alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open.”161 Mr. Oakley still has the right to
engage in sexual activity, and alternatives to his restriction would be for Mr.
Oakley to get two jobs or take parenting classes to show that he could support
his children. By employing these alternatives, Mr. Oakley would then be able
to exercise his right to procreate again.
The third factor is unique to the prison context and is not directly
applicable to the probation context. It deals with what kind of “ripple
effect”162 the asserted right would have on guards and inmates in the closed
environment of the correctional institution. Because probationers naturally
have more freedom than an inmate confined to prison, instead of fellow
probationers or his probation officer feeling the “ripple effect,” the people
being affected by Mr. Oakley asserting his right to procreate would be his
current children, future children, the mothers of these children, and the
community at large supporting his children who have fallen below the poverty
line.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See generally O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
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The final factor in the reasonableness test is an analysis of whether there
are alternatives to the restriction that would achieve the same goal.163 The
Turner court makes clear to point out that “this is not a ‘least restrictive
alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down
every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s
constitutional complaint.”164 There are no reasonable alternatives to the
probation condition imposed on Mr. Oakley that would achieve the same goal
of protecting the children. Mr. Oakley has had numerous opportunities to
support his children, and yet he continues to intentionally disregard the
mandate to support them. Conditioning his probation on getting several jobs to
pay his support does not seem to be a realistic alternative.
F.

Other Constitutional Tests Used for Probation Restrictions

While the Supreme Court has never articulated a clear standard for how to
scrutinize probation restrictions, several appellate level courts have created
their own tests. In United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,165 the Ninth Circuit
considered the legality of a condition that required the probationer to “submit
to a search of her person or property at any time when requested by a lawenforcement officer.”166 The court created the following standard for its
analysis:167 “In determining whether a reasonable relationship exists, we have
found it necessary to give consideration to the purposes sought to be served by
probation, the extent to which the full constitutional guarantees available to
those under probation should be accorded probationers, and the legitimate
needs of law enforcement.”168 Several jurisdictions have adopted this three
part test to analyze probation conditions.169
Under this lesser standard of scrutiny, it is obvious that Mr. Oakley’s
condition would pass constitutional muster. The purpose of giving Mr. Oakley
probation instead of incarceration is to rehabilitate him into a law abiding
163. Id.
164. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
165. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
166. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 101 (citing Consuelo-Gonzalez , 521 F.2d at 261).
167. Id.
168. See Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 262.
169. See Horwitz, supra note 89, at 101 (citing United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 567 (9th
Cir. 1981) (applying restated version of Consuelo-Gonzalez test and noting “broad discretion” of
the trial judge in establishing probation conditions); United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 148
(5th Cir. 1979) (discussing former congressman who violated Federal Election Campaign Act on
probation with the restriction not to engage in any political activity and court held that “a
condition of probation satisfies the statute so long as it is reasonably related to rehabilitation of
the probationer, protection of the public against other offenses during its term, deterrence of
future misconduct by the probationer or general deterrence of others, condign punishment or
some combination of these objectives.”)).
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father who pays child support while giving him the opportunity to make money
and develop relationships with his children. Courts have stated that a person’s
right to procreate while in prison is not an absolute right, and thus the same can
apply to probation. Additionally, with the overwhelming number of children
below the poverty line, there is an obvious need for some law enforcement and
judicial control over a parent intentionally refusing to pay child support.
Another standard applied to analyze probation conditions is the
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine.170 This balancing test involves four
factors: (1) the nature of the right affected; (2) the degree of the infringement
of the right; (3) the nature of the benefit conferred; and (4) the nature of the
state’s interest in conditioning the benefit.171 This too has been a valid test
used by a number of courts and commentators to analyze the constitutionality
of probation conditions.172
Another standard of scrutiny that has been applied to probation, and the
standard adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Oakley, is
that “the conditions of probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as
long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the defendant’s
rehabilitation.”173 Followers of this standard adopt the American Bar
Association standard that:
Conditions imposed by the court should be designed to assist the probationer in
leading a law-abiding life. They should be reasonably related to his
rehabilitation and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his
freedom of religion. They should not be so vague or ambiguous as to give no
real guidance.174

G. Analysis
Although it may be argued that the condition on Mr. Oakley’s probation
would not pass strict scrutiny, “probation conditions – like prison regulations –

170. See id. at 105.
171. See id. at 105-06.
172. See id. at 106 (citing People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(asserting that unconstitutional conditions doctrine requires that conditions impinging on
constitutional rights be reasonably related to compelling state interest in rehabilitation and that no
less restrictive alternative be available); Michael G. Honeymar, Jr., Note, Alcoholics Anonymous
as a Condition of Drunk Driving Probation: When Does it Amount to Establishment of Religion?,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 437, 439 n.9 (1997) (“Various commentators have applied this doctrine to
analyze the constitutionality of certain probationary conditions.”)).
173. Krebs v. Schwarz, 568 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Miller, 499 N.W.
2d 215, 216 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
174. See Miller, 499 N.W.2d at 218 (quoting A.B.A., Standards Relating to Probation, Sec.
3.2(b), at 44 (Approved Draft 1970)).
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are not subject to strict scrutiny.”175 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court points
out, if probation conditions were subject to strict scrutiny, then incarceration, a
more severe punitive sanction which deprives individuals of their right to be
free from physical restraint and infringes upon numerous fundamental rights,
would also be subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis.176 If probation conditions
were subject to strict scrutiny, it leads to one of two illogical and unworkable
conclusions: (1) strict scrutiny for conditions of probation that infringe upon
fundamental rights but not for the more restrictive alternative of incarceration,
or (2) the state must meet the heavy burden of strict scrutiny every time it is
confronted with someone who has violated the law.177
While adhering to the constitutional standard of mere rationality, the
Wisconsin v. Oakley court states that the proper test for this analysis is that
“conditions of probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as
they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the person’s
rehabilitation.”178
Applying this reasonability standard, the majority of the court found that
Mr. Oakley’s condition was not overly broad because it did not eliminate Mr.
Oakley’s ability to exercise his constitutional right to procreate.179 His right
was merely restricted, and the condition on his probation could be satisfied by
making efforts to support his children as required by law or the condition
expiring at the end of his probation term.180
While acknowledging that the “no more children” probation condition
certainly appears to be reasonably related to Mr. Oakley’s rehabilitation,181 the
dissent argues that even in light of the state’s strong interest in protecting
against the further victimization of Mr. Oakley’s children, this court-ordered
condition on procreation is overly broad.182 The court again relies on
Zablocki183 to state that because there are several alternate ways to achieve the
state’s goals of rehabilitating Mr. Oakley and making him a supportive father
to his nine children, this condition is overly broad.184

175. Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 208 n.23 (Wis. 2001).
176. Id. (citing Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why is This Right Different
from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781 (1994) (advocating strict scrutiny every time an
individual is incarcerated because fundamental rights are being infringed upon)).
177. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208.
178. Id. at 215 (Crooks, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 212.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
182. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 221 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
183. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
184. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 221-22 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
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In light of the overwhelming consensus that this constitutional test is
liberal and easily passable, the dissent’s arguments go more toward refuting a
strict scrutiny analysis. If the appropriate test is the rational basis test, then the
condition, which is limited in scope and able to be overcome by Mr. Oakley
taking responsibility and supporting his children, cannot be said to be
overbroad.
Likewise, this condition on his probation passes the second prong of the
rational basis test. Because Mr. Oakley’s crime was failing to support his
children, a probation condition dealing with procreative rights is reasonably
related to the state’s goal of rehabilitating Mr. Oakley and making him a
supportive father. The State in the case argues that the condition essentially
bans Oakley from violating the law again.185 Future violations of the law
would be detrimental to Oakley’s rehabilitation, which necessitates preventing
him from continuing to disregard its dictates. So the condition on his
probation is reasonably related to his rehabilitation because it will assist Mr.
Oakley in conforming his conduct to the law.186 Because the rational basis test
is such an easy standard for this condition on probation to pass, there is no real
doubt that this clause in Mr. Oakley’s terms of probation passes constitutional
review under this lower scrutiny standard.
It is clear from Supreme Court decisions that strict scrutiny is not the
appropriate test to apply to probation conditions. While no clear test has been
articulated for the probation context, it is apparent that Mr. Oakley’s probation
condition would pass constitutional scrutiny under any of these lower
standards of scrutiny. Whether the appropriate test is the rational basis test,
reasonableness test, or some combination of the two, the important point to
recognize is that strict scrutiny is not the appropriate test to apply to probation
conditions, and therefore, the condition on Mr. Oakley’s probation is
constitutional.
H. Examples of Constitutional Probation Conditions
Probation conditions of all kinds in all different jurisdictions have been
held to be constitutional.187 In establishing the fact that convicted individuals

185. Id. at 213.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 1995) (prohibiting abortion
protestor convicted of obstructing a federal court order from harassing, intimidating or picketing
in front of any abortion family planning services center was probation condition was permissible
restriction upon protestor’s First Amendment right of free speech and association given that
restriction was reasonably related to the goal of prohibiting further illegal conduct); State v.
Miller, 499 N.W.2d 204, 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining condition of probation which
prohibited defendant from telephoning any woman not a member of his own family without
permission of a probation officer was valid and not unreasonable).
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do not enjoy the same liberty and freedom as citizens who have not violated
the law,188 the Wisconsin Supreme Court points to the case of State v. Kline189
for support of its condition on Mr. Oakley’s probation. In Kline, the defendant
was a physically and emotionally abusive father, who, when high on
methamphetamine, regularly abused his children.190 At one point, the
defendant broke his son’s arm, and when he and his wife subsequently had
another child, the defendant caused a spiral fracture in his two and a half
month old baby’s leg and bruised her head and chest.191 The defendant was
sentenced to probation for all of these heinous acts with the condition that,
among other things, he obtain prior written approval of the court before
fathering any future children.192 Although the defendant argued that this
condition deserved strict scrutiny for violating his right to procreate, the
Oregon appellate court denied this and determined that the condition was valid
because it “did not impose a total ban on defendant’s reproductive rights . . .
[it] provide[d] potential victims with protection from future injury and
interfere[d] with defendant’s fundamental rights to a permissible degree.”193
In a similar case, a condition on probation was upheld that required a
defendant who sexually assaulted his own daughter to obtain his probation
agent’s permission before entering into an intimate or sexual relationship.194
Although the condition infringed upon a constitutional right, the Wisconsin
appellate court held that it was reasonable and not overly broad.195
I.

Different Rationales for Probation

There are four different rationales used to support and justify putting a
person on probation. The traditional rationale is that probation is for the
purpose of offender rehabilitation.196 “Most criminal statutes explicitly state
that the purpose of intermediate sanctions is to rehabilitate,197 and the Supreme
Court has noted that the purpose of probation is to provide a young or
unhardened offender an opportunity to rehabilitate himself without institutional

188. Von Arx v. Schwarz, 517 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
189. State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
190. Id. at 698.
191. Id. at 698-99.
192. Id. at 699.
193. Id.
194. See generally Krebs v. Schwarz, 568 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
195. Id. at 28.
196. See Developments in the Law, supra note 83, at 1956.
197. See id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.187(1) (1997) (permitting judges to impose alternatives
to incarceration so as to “best serve the needs of society, punish criminal offenders, and provide
the opportunity for rehabilitation”); IOWA CODE § 907.7 (1997) (“[T]he purposes of probation are
to provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant.”)).
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confinement.”198 Another traditional rationale to support probation is the idea
of public protection.199 Although incarceration is the ultimate form of public
protection, the probation system has also been used to protect the public by
imposing restrictions on a probationer’s freedom through various conditions on
his or her probation.200 Two less traditional rationales for probation are the
ideas of just punishment for the probationer and deterrence for the probation in
committing future crimes.201
Wisconsin law gives judges great latitude in choosing between
incarceration and probation. In sentencing, a Wisconsin judge can take into
account a broad variety of factors including: the gravity of the offense; the
need for protection of the public and potential victims; the past record of
criminal offenses; any history of undesirable behavior patterns; defendant’s
personality, character, and social traits; the results of a pre-sentence
investigation; the vicious or aggravated nature of the crime; the degree of
defendant’s culpability; the defendant’s demeanor at trial; the defendant’s age,
educational background, and employment record; the defendant’s remorse,
repentance and cooperativeness; the defendant’s need for close rehabilitative
control; the rights of public; and the length of pretrial detention.202
Wisconsin Statute § 973.09(1)(a) provides that:
[I]f a person is convicted of a crime, the court, by order, may withhold
sentence or impose sentence under s. 973.15 and stay its execution, and in
either case place the person on probation to the department for a stated period,
stating in the order the reasons therefore. The court may impose any
conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate.203

The Wisconsin Supreme Court notes that the purpose of the probation statute is
to rehabilitate the defendant and protect society without placing the defendant
in prison.204
The Wisconsin Supreme Court believed that giving Mr. Oakley probation
was a better alternative to incarceration. “When a judge allows a convicted
individual to bypass a prison sentence and enjoy the relative freedom of
probation, it is within the judge’s discretion to take reasonable measures to
further the objective of rehabilitation and protect society and potential victims
from future wrongdoing.”205 Restrictions are meant to assure that the
198. See id. at 1956-57 (citing Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943)).
199. See id. at 1960.
200. Id.
201. Developments in the Law, supra note 83, at 1962-63.
202. See Wisconsin v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Wis. 2001) (quoting State v. Guzman,
480 N.W.2d 446 (1992)).
203. See id. (quoting WIS. STAT. § 973.09(1)(a) (1998)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 206.
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probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community
is not harmed by the probationer being at large.206
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has said that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process clause implicitly includes a right to privacy, which, in turn, includes
the fundamental right to procreate. If a law-abiding citizen’s right to procreate
was being infringed upon, that person would deserve the highest level of strict
scrutiny to determine if the infringement was constitutional. However,
prisoners and probationers are subject to a more conditional form of liberty.
Prisoners are not afforded strict scrutiny for infringement of their fundamental
rights, and because probation and prison share many similarities, a probationer
is likewise not afforded the highest level of scrutiny when his rights are
infringed. Although courts disagree over which lesser standard to apply to
probationer’s rights, the important fact to recognize is that until the Supreme
Court announces a specific level of scrutiny to use for probationers, courts are
justified in adopting any standard of scrutiny as long as it is not strict scrutiny.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Oakley, chose to use the
“rational basis test” to evaluate Mr. Oakley’s probation condition. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that the holding in Wisconsin v. Oakley
is a narrow holding for an extraordinary set of facts.207 However, the decision
by this court is proper in light of the circumstances. Under the rational basis
standard, the condition on Mr. Oakley’s probation is not overly broad and is
reasonably related to his rehabilitation. Mr. Oakley’s ability to procreate is
only restricted, not eliminated, and if he were sent to prison, he would not be
able to exercise his procreation rights anyway. When Mr. Oakley intentionally
committed the crime of refusing to support his children, he gave up certain
rights and freedoms. Given the overwhelming problems that coincide with
children in poverty, the state of Wisconsin has a compelling interest in
protecting their youth. If Mr. Oakley is on probation, he can work two jobs,
make money to support his family, and build a relationship with his nine
children. Given the compelling reasons to give Mr. Oakley probation over
incarceration, a condition that protects children, simultaneously assists him in
his rehabilitation, and possibly deters him from future criminality can only be
viewed as a positive step by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
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